Evaluating Casual Impact of Microfinance: Challenges and Results by Dmitry Shapiro
― 3 ―
Evaluating Casual Impact of Microfinance: 
Challenges and Results
Dmitry Shapiro(1)
In this paper, I survey the literature that studied the impacts of microfinance. 
The survey consists of four parts. First, I describe the methodological challenges 
associated with the impact evaluation of microfinance and how the randomized 
control trial (RCT) approach can address those challenges. I then present the 
results of six highly influential RCT studies published in the Special Issue of the 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics in 2015. All six studies reached 
a similar conclusion that the overall impact of microfinance was modest and not 
transformative. Second, I describe the reasons suggested in the literature explaining 
why the impact is limited. Third, I survey two recent RCT studies that found a 
positive impact of microfinance and then discuss why these two studies differ from 
those in the Special Issue. Finally, I survey evidence of the negative impacts of 
microfinance.
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1. Introduction
Microfinance, more accurately known as “microcredit,” refers to the provision of 
loans to the poor and the poorest, where the latter are defined as households earning 
under US$1 day per person (Daley-Harris, 2009).(2) At the end of the last century, 
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(2) “Microfinance” is the most commonly used term today, which is what I use in this paper as 
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microfinance institutions (MFIs) turned providing credit to the poor from a near-
impossible task into a well-established booming industry throughout the developing 
world. As of December 2010, a total of 3,652 MFIs reached over 200 million people, 
most of whom were among the poorest when they took their first loan (Maes and 
Reed, 2012). The success is particularly remarkable given the plethora of obstacles 
that, for a long time, have discouraged formal credit institutions from financing the 
poor. Adverse selection, moral hazard, a lack of collaterizable assets, the absence 
of enforcement mechanisms and high costs have made microfinance almost non-
existent, or at least subsidized.(3) The impossibility of providing loans to the poor, 
combined with the apparent eventual success of MFIs, has been acknowledged by the 
Norwegian Nobel Committee. In its announcement of the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize 
award to Muhammad Yunus—the man who successfully pioneered the concepts of 
microfinance and microcredit—it specifically stated that, until recently, “...loans to 
poor people without any financial security had appeared to be an impossible idea” (Nobel 
Foundation, 2006).
The success of microfinance has been widely attributed to several innovative 
features that have led to a large reduction in interest rates. The first most important 
innovation is group lending, a distinctive feature of early microlenders, such as 
Grameen Bank, BRAC or BancoSol. Group lending offers several benefits to lenders 
and helps reduce the likelihood of defaults. It provides insurance against idiosyncratic 
negative income shocks faced by individual group members. It also reduces the 
problem of moral hazard, as it is easier for group members to monitor other 
borrowers’ actions than it is for lenders. Another important feature of microfinance 
contracts is the provision of dynamic incentives combined with progressive lending; 
well. However, it should be noted that whenever I refer to “microfinance,” I specifically refer 
to “microcredit” or “microlending.” Microfinance, accurately speaking, is a broader term that 
includes other financial services, such as microsavings, microinsurance, and so on.
(3) During pre-microfinance times, in Bangladesh, loans targeted for the poor households by 
traditional banks had repayments rates of as low as 51.6% in 1980, further decreasing to 
18.8% by 1988-89, and were heavily subsidized by the government (Khalily and Meyer, 
1993).
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for example, repayment in the current period is a pre-requisite for any future loan 
disbursement. By a standard repeated-game argument, borrowers have incentives to 
repay current loans, as it provides them access to future, usually larger, loans. Finally, 
there are other notable features of microfinance contracts, such as conducting regular 
group meetings with the loan officer, or creating a repayment culture by making 
repayments frequent and small. All of these innovations had a large impact on 
reducing lending costs, which then translated into an even larger effect on reducing 
interest rates (Banerjee, 2013).
Once it became clear that providing credit to the poor can be sustainable—thanks to 
Grameen Bank and other early MFIs—microfinance was embraced by policymakers 
and donors as an effective policy tool to fight poverty.(4) The following quote by 
the Prime Minister of Bangladesh at the 1997 Microcredit Summit shows the high 
expectations that politicians placed on the potential of microfinance: “In our careful 
assessment, meeting the credit needs of the poor is one of the most effective ways to 
fight exploitation and poverty. I believe that this campaign will become one of the great 
humanitarian movements of history. This campaign will allow the world’s poorest 
people to free themselves from the bondage of poverty and deprivation to bloom to their 
fullest potentials to the benefit of all — rich and poor.” (Banerjee et al., 2015b). In the 
same 1997 Microcredit Summit, a group of high-profile policymakers, charities, and 
practitioners started a fund drive to raise US$20 billion dollars for microfinance start-
ups in the next ten years. That included attracting new resources and reallocating 
existing resources from traditional poverty alleviation programs toward microfinance 
(Morduch, 1999).
Since the 1997 Microcredit Summit, microfinance has become a multibillion-dollar 
(4) The average operational self-sufficiency of MFIs is estimated to be 111% (Table 11.1 in 
Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010), where the value of 100% indicates full operational self-
sufficiency. However, there are some caveats. First, there is a substantial variation, with some 
MFIs having operational self-sufficiency of as low as 77%. Second, operational self-sufficiency 
does not mean self-sufficiency at “market” prices, as MFIs often get “soft” loan terms from 
donors and investors, which can be viewed as indirect subsidies. Third, there is also a concern 
of whether financial reports provided by MFIs are reliable.
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(usually non-profit) industry enjoying the strong support of the wealthy and the 
powerful. Currently, it affects hundreds of millions of the poorest, most vulnerable 
individuals, both directly (by providing credits and other financial services) and 
indirectly (by influencing allocation of funds among poverty alleviation programs). 
Thus, a natural and vital question arises: What is the impact of microfinance? 
Specifically, has the impact of microfinance been transformative for the poor, and has 
it delivered on its promise to “allow the world’s poorest people to free themselves from 
the bondage of poverty”?
This paper provides a survey of studies that aimed to answer these questions and 
evaluate the impacts of microfinance. The survey is centered on the randomized 
control trial (RCT) approach to the impact evaluation. The reason is two-fold. First, 
as I will discuss in the paper, a methodologically rigorous evaluation of the causal 
effect of microfinance is challenging because of the numerous selection biases that 
are common for any program with voluntary participation. By introducing exogenous 
randomization, the RCT approach has the advantage of being able to correctly 
evaluate treatment (access to microfinance) effects. The second is because both the 
proponents of the RCT approach and its opponents (e.g. Bédécarrats et al., 2020) 
agree that, currently, this approach is widely regarded as the benchmark in the field of 
impact evaluation (Bédécarrats et al., 2020) and “... entirely dominate[s] development 
economics” (Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, 2019, p. 1).
I begin the survey by describing the RCT approach to evaluating the impact of 
microfinance and then present a very influential group of RCT studies that examined 
the impacts of seven different MFIs in six different countries. These studies were 
published in the Special Issue of the American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 
(hereafter the Special Issue) in 2015. The Special Issue has been widely celebrated 
for its seminal contribution to the field of impact evaluation and, as some argued, has 
provided a decisive contribution to the debate on the impact of microfinance (Ogden, 
2016).
While each study in the Special Issue was designed and implemented independently, 
all six studies were coordinated in that they all used comparable outcomes and 
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estimation strategies. Moreover, all six studies reached a roughly similar conclusion: 
“Summarizing and interpreting results across [the six] studies, we note a consistent 
pattern of modestly positive, but not transformative, effects.” (Banerjee et al., 2015b, 
p. 1). The result itself was not new in that there were earlier impact studies, 
including non-RCT ones, that reached a similar conclusion (e.g., Coneman, 1999). 
Nonetheless, the sheer scale of the evidence amassed by the Special Issue—data from 
six different countries and different types of MFI (urban vs. rural) employing varying 
methodologies (group vs. individual liability)—and the similarity of results shifted the 
debate from what the impact of microfinance is to why it is so limited.
The second part of the survey reviews three strands in the literature that offer 
various reasons why the availability of microfinance has had such modest effects. The 
first strand focuses on the overall methodological limitations of the RCT approach, 
including the problems in implementing the RCT protocol and issues related to the 
internal and external validity of the RCT studies in the Special Issue. The second 
one argues that the results of the RCT studies are mis-interpreted. The argument 
goes that RCT studies measure the effect on marginal borrowers rather than on infra-
marginal borrowers, which means that the RCT studies understate the average impact 
of microfinance. The third strand of literature makes the argument that, perhaps, 
microcredit is not something that the poor need to begin with.
The third part of the survey looks at more recent RCT studies that find the positive 
impact of microfinance, including one paper that used the exact same methodology 
and estimation strategy as the papers from the Special Issue. These recent papers 
are interesting not only because they find positive results but also because they 
specifically address why their results are different from those of the Special Issue 
studies.
The last part of the survey is the only one that does not look at RCT studies. 
Instead, it focuses on the arguments of opponents of microfinance and the studies that 
reported the negative impacts of microfinance on both the individual level and on the 
macrolevel. This part was included to demonstrate that the debate on microfinance is 
not limited to whether its impact is transformative or modest; the impact (potentially) 
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can be negative. In fact, the Special Issue itself begins with the acknowledgment that 
“Various theories—of poverty traps, behavioral decision making, general equilibrium 
effects, and/or credit market competition—suggest that the impacts of expanding access 
to credit on poor people need not be positive, and could even be negative. (Banerjee 
et al., 2015b, p. 1). I conclude the survey with my personal opinions regarding the 
impact of microfinance and the current state of the literature.
2. Impact Evaluation and RCT approach
2.1. Methodological Challenges
With all the focus placed by impact evaluation studies on methodology and minor 
details of estimation procedures, the fact that microfinance does come with many 
inspiring stories of pulling poor households out of poverty can be easily overlooked. 
For example, consider the story of a family of seven who used to live in a poor 
neighborhood in Monterrey, Mexico, in a home with cardboard walls and dirt floors. 
Upon taking out their first loan of US$150 from ADMIC, a local microlender, the 
household was able to purchase enough supplies to launch a successful business of 
selling hand-sewn decorations. After ten loans, the household earned enough to install 
a toilet and an outdoor shower and was preparing to build the second floor (Armendáriz 
and Morduch, 2010, p. 267).
However, these stories—as inspiring as they are—are not a substitute for rigorous 
impact evaluation. Methodologically speaking, the impact evaluation of microfinance 
is a challenging task due to statistical biases that commonly arise when participation 
and the use of the program is non-random (Banerjee et al., 2015b). First, there is a 
demand-side selection bias. As taking microloans is voluntary, microborrowers are 
likely to self-select based on their entrepreneurial drive, productivity, and so on. This 
bias can go in either direction. On the one hand, people may borrow because of a 
negative shock that will produce downward bias: impact estimates will be lower than 
the true causal effect. On the other hand, people may borrow when they expect a 
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positive shock or because they are more capable, which will produce upward bias.
Second, there could be a supply-side selection bias due to non-randomness in 
lenders’ decision to lend. While some characteristics used by lenders in their decision 
making can be observable and measurable (e.g., age, gender, education, etc.), others 
might not be. Third, another supply-side selection bias arises from the fact that MFIs 
do not locate their offices randomly. Again, the bias can go in either direction. If an 
MFI establishes its offices in locations with good infrastructure, this will produce 
upward bias in estimates. In comparison, if an MFI locates its offices to serve 
stagnant and poor areas, this situation will produce downward bias. Finally, there is 
an issue of reverse causality. If households that take microloans are richer than their 
counterparts, then is it because easy access to microfinance made them richer, or is it 
because it is easier for richer households to get a microloan?
Given these challenges, the overall lack of rigorous impact evaluation studies is not 
surprising. As recently as 2010, Armendáriz and Morduch (2010, p. 267) wrote “There’s 
much interest in microfinance and many anecdotes about its benefits. But, so far, there are 
surprisingly few rigorous empirical studies of net impacts.” To put this into perspective, 
this was written five years after 2005, the year declared by the United Nations as the 
“Year of Microfinance,” and four years after Muhammad Yunus received the Nobel 
Peace Prize. In 2011, a systematic review of the existing impact evaluation studies 
ordered by the UK government found that almost all studies were biased, incomplete 
or poorly designed (Duvendack et al., 2011). The few studies that were valid typically 
concluded that microfinance had a limited and heterogenous impact. Finally, Banerjee 
et al. (2015b) noted that most of the empirical evidence invoked by microcredit’s 
proponents has been largely based on anecdotes, descriptive statistics, and impact 
studies that, overall, failed to disentangle causation from correlation.
2.2. RCT Method
The methodological breakthrough came with studies using the RCT method, which, 
when done properly, can overcome many of the statistical biases mentioned above. 
“The beauty of randomized evaluations is that the results are what they are: we compare 
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the outcome in the treatment with the outcome in the control group, see whether they 
are different, and if so by how much” (Banerjee, 2007, pp. 115-16). Setting aside 
implementation issues, the way the RCT approach works is that it introduces an 
exogenous source of variation. For example, if a researcher can randomly choose a 
group (treatment) that gains access to microfinance services and then randomly choose 
another group (control) that is denied access, then, as long as the randomization is 
done properly, the difference between the average outcomes of the treated and control 
groups is the average causal impact of intervention.
To see how RCTs are implemented in practice, consider the study of Karlan and 
Zinman (2011). The authors worked with a Philippine bank that gave three-month 
loans to poor individuals based on a credit-scoring model. A random lottery was used 
to determine whether loan applicants, who were marginally eligible for the loan could 
obtain a loan. Comparing the outcomes of the control group (those who did not get 
the loan) against the treatment group (those who did get the loan), the authors showed 
that for the population of marginally eligible borrowers, obtaining a loan had no effect 
on consumption, had a negative effect on business creation, and led to a higher stress 
level among male borrowers.
While randomized evaluations have been embraced as the gold standard for 
evaluations, the RCT approach does have its limitations. Bauchet and Morduch 
(2010) summarized them as follows. First, it provides only an estimate of the average 
impact; it cannot say much about the median impact or the overall distribution. 
While the unbiased estimate of the average impact is an important parameter that is 
worth knowing, consider the situation in which half of the treated population gains 
by 100% and the other half loses by 100%. Then, the average impact is zero, but 
the heterogeneity of the impact remains hidden.(5) Second, RCT studies might have 
high internal validity but low external validity. Consider, for example, the Karlan and 
Zinman (2011) study mentioned above. The study provides an unbiased estimate of 
the impact of providing the loan to individuals who are a) interested in obtaining the 
(5) To be clear, these are limitations and not insurmountable obstacles. It is possible to learn 
about the distribution of impacts, for example, by building in stratification.
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loan and b) marginally eligible. However, the extent to which these results would be 
applicable to another group of borrowers remains unclear. Third, for RCT to provide 
an unbiased estimate, it is essential that the initial random assignment is maintained 
throughout the study. This, however, can be difficult to implement in the field. For 
example, it is common for some participants to quit in the middle of the study; if the 
group of “quitters” is non-random, then this can lead to biased estimates. Another 
example is contamination, which occurs when the MFI being evaluated—or another 
MFI—starts working with people in the control group/area thereby contaminating the 
results.
2.3. The Special Issue
Despite its limitations, the RCT method has been widely viewed as a promising 
approach for studying the microfinance impact. In 2015, American Economic Journal: 
Applied Economics published a special issue dedicated to RCT studies on the impact 
of microfinance. The Special Issue had six articles that examined seven microfinance 
lenders in six different countries—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, 
Mongolia, and Morocco—during various periods from 2003 to 2012. Table 1 provides 
detailed characteristics of the microfinance programs studied in the Special Issue. 
While there were natural variations among the six studies, and each study was 
conducted independently, the authors exerted substantial effort to ensure that the 
impact of microcredit was estimated using common estimation strategies for a set of 
common outcomes.
<Table 1> Main Characteristics of the Six RCTs in the Special Issue
Source: Table 1 in Bédécarrats et al. (2020) 
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Despite the variations in the program characteristics, the findings of the six 
studies proved to be quite similar and rather disheartening, as the main conclusion 
of all studies was that access to microcredit was not transformative for borrowers’ 
businesses or for their consumption. For example, Banerjee et al. (2015a) studied 
Spandana, one of the largest Indian MFIs at the time, and its microlending program 
in the city of Hyderabad. The authors showed that access to microcredit had no 
impact on nondurable and food consumption and found no evidence of increased 
human capital investment. The impact on consumption of durable goods, as well as 
on business creation and business assets, was positive in the initial endline survey. In 
later surveys, however, increases in profit and consumption of durable goods became 
insignificant.
Overall, the main takeaways from the six RCTs are as follows. First, there is a 
low take-up rate among prospective borrowers (except for the Bosnian study). In the 
treatment group, the take-up rate varies from 17% in the Morocco study to 57% in 
the Mongolian study (Table 10 in Cai et al., 2020). The low take-up rate poses the 
problem of low statistical power for randomized identification strategies. Furthermore, 
it raises the question of whether relaxing credit constraints is an effective tool for 
lifting poor people out of poverty. Second, all six studies reported a lack of evidence 
regarding the transformative effects of microcredit on the average borrower. Third, the 
lack of a transformative effect does not come from borrowers’ lack of attempts. There 
is evidence of borrowers’ increased investment in their business growth. Fourth, while 
there is some evidence that microfinance has a heterogeneous impact on borrowers 
(some groups benefitted, while others did not), the overall low statistical power made 
statistical analysis of this conjecture impossible. Finally, microcredit does not have 
any catastrophic effect either. In other words, neither claims made by the proponents 
of microfinance nor claims made by its critics, such as those made by Bateman and 
Chang (2012), received support from the studies.
While the study by Banerjee et al. (2015b), which is the introductory paper in 
the Special Issue, frames the results somewhat positively (i.e., the positive effect is 
not transformative but is, at least, modest), it is worth emphasizing just how few of 
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studied impacts proved to be significant despite having such a large, geographically 
diverse, and coordinated group of studies. Table 2 summarizes the significance and 
signs of some of the outcomes studied by the Special Issue papers. All in all, among 
the 298 impacts analyzed in the Special Issue, only 10 were significant at 1%. The 
Bosnian, Ethiopian, and Mongolian studies had zero significant impacts out of 47, 37, 
and 41 estimated impacts, respectively. The Indian study had one significant impact 
out of 99 (Bédécarrats et al., 2020). Using 10% significance instead of 1% still means 
that as many as 81% of the studied effects are insignificant. Table 2 also uses the 
10% threshold and shows 17 significant impacts. If a more stringent threshold of 1% 
was used, then none of the impacts would be significant. 
3. Reasons for the Limited Impact
Based on the results mentioned above, a natural question arises: “Why do 
these studies show such limited impact?” In this section, I discuss three groups 
of explanations suggested in the literature: improper implementation of the RCT 
protocol by (at least some of) the six studies as well as concerns over their internal 
and external validity; incorrect interpretation of the results; and, more broadly, an 
argument that microcredit is not something that the poor need to begin with.
(6) ‘Positive’ (‘Negative’) means the impact is positively (negatively) significant at 10%; ‘n.s’ 
means not significant at 10%; ‘-’ means no data.
<Table 2> Main Results of the Six RCTs in the Special Issue(6)
Source: Table 2 of Bédécarrats et al. (2020). 
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3.1. Methodological Issues Related to RCTs
Since its publication, the Special Issue featuring six RCT studies has become a 
highly respected source of knowledge on microfinance to date. One can see it in the 
number of citations received by the papers from the Special Issue, in how reverently 
it is treated in more recent works (see, e.g., Meager, 2019), and in how widely its 
results have been disseminated among microfinance practitioners. Not everyone, 
however, agrees that the six RCT studies deserve such a prominent position in the 
field. Bédécarrats, Guérin and Roubaud (2020), hereafter BGR, provided a thorough 
and critical analysis of the six Special Issue studies, highlighting such issues as low 
statistical power, inconsistencies with sampling, data collection, and questionable 
interpretations.
The most detailed criticism in BGR was directed toward the Moroccan study 
(Crépon et al., 2015), specifically, regarding its internal validity.(7) First, BGR argued 
that randomization, a key element of the RCT methodology, was not done properly 
in Crépon et al. (2015). A very low take-up rate, much lower than initially expected, 
made the research team and loan officers perform some mid-study corrections to 
push more villagers toward taking a microloan and to increase the overall number 
of loan-takers. That included a variety of measures, such as introducing one-off 
bonuses for loan agents, withdrawing the minimum quota for women, pushing back 
village borders, and dropping villages with zero take-up rates. Notably, these mid-
study corrections created not only internal but also external validity issues. Tweaking 
the product for the sake of the RCT meant that the RCT’s outcome was different 
from how the actual product functioned in reality. Second, there were issues with the 
data trimming of the baseline and endline surveys. According to BGR, changing the 
endline trimming threshold by 0.2% produced radically different results in terms of 
sales, expenses, investment, and profits. Finally, BGR raised concerns regarding the 
(7) The debate seems to be ongoing. Authors of Crépon et al. (2015) have responded to the 
critique raised in BGR in Crépon et al. (2019). In turn, BGR, together with the fourth co-
author, produced a working paper where they “rebutted the rebuttal” (Bédécarrats et al., 2019).
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data collection process. In particular, local interviewers in the Moroccan study did 
not speak Berber, a language spoken in the targeted area, which meant that many 
improvisation and impromptu translators were used during the data collection, which 
likely resulted in numerous errors in the data.
The question of internal validity can also be raised for other studies. For example, 
as in the Moroccan study, randomization issues can be found in the Mongolian 
and Bosnian studies. In the Mongolian study, in each selected village, loans were 
given to the first 30 women (rather than 30 randomly selected women) among those 
who expressed interest in obtaining a loan. In the study conducted in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, instead of using random selection, loan officers were simply asked to 
select potential clients who were not deemed eligible by the current MFI’s standards. 
Another example of an internal validity problem that affected the studies in the 
Special Issue was how pre-treatment baseline surveys and post-treatment endline 
surveys were conducted. In the Ethiopian study, different individuals were surveyed in 
the baseline and endline surveys, whereas in the Mexican study, 73% of the baseline 
households were not surveyed at the endline, and 89% of the endline households were 
not surveyed at the baseline.
In addition to internal validity concerns raised in BGR, there is another concern—
acknowledged in the Special Issue itself—regarding low statistical power. McKenzie 
(2012) was the first to point out that the RCT studies in the Special Issue were 
heavily underpowered, demonstrating that, to detect a 10% increase in profits with 
90% power in the Indian study (Banerjee et al., 2015a), the required sample size had 
to be over 15 million (McKenzie, 2012, p. 218).
More recently, Dahal and Fiala (2020) reviewed the six Special Issue studies 
together with the Philippine study by Karlan and Zinman (2011) and the Uganda 
study by Fiala (2018). They also showed that due to the low take-up rate, every study 
was considerably underpowered to detect the effect sizes. Pooling the data across 
the eight studies considerably improved the situation, though not perfectly. With the 
pooled sample, they found a significantly positive (at 1%) impact of microfinance 
on business profit and a significant increase of household assets. The impact on total 
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consumption remained insignificant.(8) Dahal and Fiala’s (2020) overall conclusion, 
however, was very cautious:
“Unlike the perception among many critics of microfinance, the studies reviewed here do 
not discredit the role of microcredit in poverty alleviation and improving [the] livelihoods of 
poor households. Nor does combining the samples together definitively show impacts. What 
these results do suggest is that the impact of the microfinance programs studied in these 
experiments is not well known.” (p. 4, emphasis is mine).
3.2. Interpretation of the RCT Results
Dahal and Fiala (2020) chose a very measured interpretation of their results, despite 
being able to obtain some positive significance from the pooled sample. As they 
have acknowledged, the reason is that theirs is a push-button replication. This means 
that their approach took data at their face value and did not address issues related to 
possible data contamination, such as those found in the Moroccan study discussed in 
the previous subsection.
Another reason why one should be cautious when interpreting RCT study results 
is that, as argued in the literature, they do not actually answer the “big” questions 
regarding the impact of microfinance. These so-called “big” questions that should 
be addressed by impact studies are as follows: Have regional poverty rates fallen 
thanks to microcredit? or Have Grameen Bank and others like it made an appreciable 
difference in the economic and social lives of customers? (Morduch, 2020). These are, 
in fact, not the questions that these studies answered. Instead, the RCT studies of the 
Special Issue evaluated the impact of microfinance on marginal microfinance clients 
who adopted microfinance later than typical MFI clients. In other words, even though 
RCT studies provide unbiased impact estimates, the impact estimates they provide 
are on the external margin, which means that they understate the average impact of 
microfinance (Wydick, 2016).
(8) Meager (2019) used pooled data from seven RCT studies—the six studies from the Special 
Issue and the Philippines study by Karlan and Zinman (2011)—and reached similar 
conclusions.
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Indeed, four out of the six Special Issue studies relied on randomization of the 
order in which a given microcredit lender entered new locations. However, the new 
locations entered by MFIs in the mid-2000s were likely to be marginal areas that had 
been previously neglected, entirely or partially, by microfinance industry. They were 
unlikely to be representative of “regular” areas. Furthermore, the control areas did not 
remain void of microcredit during the study duration. For example, a study of a large 
Indian MFI, Spandana, entering the city of Hyderabad (Banerjee et al., 2015a) used 
randomization at the level of the neighborhoods where Spandana provided its loans. 
However, other lenders moved into the neighborhoods left vacant by Spandana; hence, 
18.3% of the control group (vs. 26.7% in the treatment group) had microcredit loans 
12-18 months after the baseline survey. In other words, the interpretation of Banerjee 
et al. (2015a)’s results is actually very narrow, as it identifies the impact of bringing 
additional microcredit into parts of Hyderabad (Morduch, 2020).
In comparison, the Bosnia and Herzegovina study (Ausburg et al., 2015) did not use 
entry as the basis for its randomization strategy. Instead, it used an MFI that operated 
in an area that was already heavily credit-saturated and over-indebtedness was a 
recognized problem: 41% of the treatment group had microcredit at baseline. The 
randomization strategy was applied to randomly select borrowers, whose credit scores 
were too low get a loan. Clearly, these are not typical borrowers.(9) From a policy 
perspective, it might be worthwhile to see what happens if those borrowers are given 
access to microcredit, and this is what the results of Ausburg et al. (2015) tell us. 
However, it remains unclear whether we can infer anything from this study regarding 
the impact on typical borrowers (Morduch, 2020).
The discussion in this subsection, so far, has explained why the RCT studies in 
the Special Issue may have understated the microfinance impact. The impact they 
(9) Providing credit to those borrowers also raises some ethical issues. Giving loans to individuals 
with low scores and history of repayment difficulties violates the “do not harm” principle 
(Bédécarrats et al., 2020). In fact, those marginal borrowers who received the loan during the 
study had repayment difficulties and risked over-indebtedness. As the authors of the Bosnian 
study concluded themselves, “All this suggests that the loan officers had good reason to classify 
our target population as marginal” (Ausburg et al., 2015, p. 201).
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identified was on marginal areas and/or marginal borrowers rather than on typical 
average borrowers, who were likely to benefit more from access to microcredit. 
However, RCT studies can also overstate the impact of microfinance because, by 
design, they cannot evaluate the negative consequences of over-indebtedness.
To evaluate the impact of microfinance, RCT studies have to look at areas or 
populations that, at the baseline, are ideally free of microcredit. Even if the baselines 
of the Special Issue studies were not perfectly microcredit-free, it would be fair to 
say that the studied areas were underserved by MFIs.(10) Therefore, almost by design, 
the issues of over-indebtedness and debt trap, which often arise when microcredit 
becomes available, do not appear. However, we know that these issues do appear 
in “regular” areas. Such over-indebtedness has been documented in four out of six 
studied countries: Bosnia, Mexico, India, and Mongolia (BGR and references therein, 
footnote 30). Thus, because of their focus on marginal areas, the RCT impact studies 
underestimated both the positive and negative outcomes of microcredit.
3.3. Mismatch between Microcredit and Borrowers’ Needs
In addition to the aforementioned methodological issues faced by RCT studies, the 
literature has suggested another explanation for the limited impact of microfinance: 
it does not consider “the lifestyles, income levels and cash flows of the poor” (Collins 
et al., 2009, p. 26). Similarly, Verrest (2013, p. 58) argues that business-development 
programs aimed at owners of small and micro-enterprises “are relevant to only a 
minority of entrepreneurs” due to variations in household vulnerability or a lack of 
business ambition. In fact, most microfinance recipients do not view microfinance 
loans as a tool for business development, but rather as a valuable diversification tool 
for dealing with irregularities in income sources (Krishna, 2004); as a way to reduce 
(10) For example, the Mexican study (Angelucci et al., 2015) followed a microfinance lender 
who was expanding in Sonora state after a long period of violence. At the baseline, 10% of 
the treatment group had microcredit loans, and 29% had formal bank loans. Thus, while the 
market was not microcredit-free, it was not credit-saturated either. The Bosnian study is an 
obvious exception, as the study itself acknowledged the credit-saturation of the market and 
focused on marginal borrowers instead.
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the household’s vulnerability to negative shocks, such as job loss or illness (Ellis, 
2000); or as a strategy for consumption and income smoothing (Bateman and Chang, 
2012; Banerjee and Duflo, 2011).
Furthermore, Banerjee (2013, p. 512) argues that many microfinance clients are 
neither interested nor “...particularly good at growing [their] businesses.” He based 
this argument on the following observations. First, in a survey conducted in India, 
80% of parents hoped their children would obtain government jobs, while 0% hoped 
their children would build successful businesses. In other words, the fact that the 
poor happened to be self-employed entrepreneurs is a reflection of their lack of 
other options rather than a reflection of their business ambitions. Second, because of 
imperfect labor markets, poor households tend to have unused labor endowment, and 
while access to microcredit allows households to make full use of such labor, it also 
means that we should not expect micro-enterprises to grow beyond the size dictated 
by the amount of that unused labor. Finally, many MFIs exclude men and target only 
female borrowers. However, as studies have shown, there is no evidence that women 
are better entrepreneurs than men. For example, a study in Sri-Lanka randomly 
assigned either US$250 or US$500 loans to micro-enterprises and found that, after 
controlling for human capital, the profits of female entrepreneurs did not go up at all, 
while the profits of their male counterparts went up significantly (de Mel et al., 2009). 
Similar results have been reported by Fafchamps et al. (2014). While there are some 
suggestions as to why female entrepreneurs performed worse—Fafchamps et al. (2014), 
for example, suggest that women are less able to turn grants into investments, because 
of other claims on their resources, such as family tax—the very fact that they do 
perform worse, combined with MFIs’ focus on female entrepreneurs, can contribute 
to a lack of significant impact of microfinance on business-related parameters, such as 
profits.
Another way in which access to microcredit does not fully suit borrowers’ needs is 
that borrowers might not be credit-constrained. A standard tool for evaluating whether 
borrowers are credit-constrained is to conduct capital-drop RCT studies. In this 
approach, microentrepreneurs are randomly assigned to different amounts of either in-
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cash or in-kind grants, allowing researchers to estimate the rate of return generated by 
the provision of extra cash to microentrepreneurs.
The evidence is somewhat mixed. On the one hand, several capital-drop RCT 
studies have found very high capital return rates, indicating that borrowers are credit-
constrained. McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) report that the marginal product of 
capital is 20%-33% per month, while de Mel et al. (2008) report it to be around 5% 
per month. Similarly, Fafchamps et al. (2014) report that both in-cash and in-kind 
grants generate very high returns on investment. On the other hand, Karlan et al. (2012) 
and Berge et al. (2015) gave a randomly selected group of micro-entrepreneurs in 
Ghana and Tanzania, respectively, a capital drop and found that this had no effect on 
investment, profits, or revenues.
4. RCT impact studies with significantly positive results
Recently, two RCT studies have demonstrated the significantly positive impacts of 
microfinance: Fiala (2018) evaluated the effect of providing loans to existing business 
owners in Uganda, and Cai et al. (2020) evaluated the impact of village credit 
programs in China. In this section, I will discuss both papers and explain how they 
differ from earlier RCT studies.
Fiala (2018) collected a sample of 1550 existing business owners who twice 
expressed interest in taking business loans and business training. These 1550 
individuals were randomly assigned to one of five treatments: control, loan treatment, 
loan treatment combined with business training, grant treatment, and grant treatment 
combined with business training. The grants came in the form of cash drops that 
did not need to be returned. In comparison, the loans had to be returned. However, 
unknown to the study participants, they were subsidized to induce the microcredit 
organization to take on clients they would not normally work with, such as men, 
those without a credit history, and those without sufficient collateral. Thus, the study 
provided a test of the impact of microloans on a sample that was interested in loans 
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but, for whatever reason, could not obtain them prior to the study.
The main result is as follows. Consistent with the earlier literature, including the 
papers surveyed above, there was no effect on business profits from any of the five 
treatments in either the pooled sample or in a sub-sample of female business owners. 
On the other hand, male business owners in the loan treatment group reported up to 
54% greater profit in the last month compared to the control group, and the overall 
result is statistically significant at 1%. The effect increases with business training, 
lower risk preferences, and no prior history of loans. There is no effect on business 
profit in grant treatments for male business owners.
Given that earlier RCT studies, including those in the Special Issue, found that 
access to microfinance has an insignificant impact on business profits, we are 
prompted to ask why the results reported by Fiala (2018) are different. Fiala (2018) 
himself points at two factors. First, his study is less statistically underpowered. Given 
the sample design-business owners who expressed an interest in loans twice-the take-
up rate was relatively high: 41% for loans and 71% for grants. As we discussed 
earlier, the Special Issue RCT findings were severely underpowered due to the low 
take-up rates (Dahal & Fiala, 2020). Additionally, the use of multiple data collections 
employed in the paper (two separate baselines and endline surveys) has been shown 
to further increase the statistical power. Second, Fiala (2018) paid particular attention 
to a group that tends to be underserved by microfinance (i.e., the group of male 
borrowers). Out of the six Special Issue RCTs, three (India, Mexico, and Mongolia) 
examined MFIs that did not provide loans to men, and one study (Morocco) had 
the minimum quota for female participants, which was later withdrawn due to a low 
take-up (Bédécarrats et al.,2020). Similarly, a well-known non-Special-Issue RCT 
impact study done by Karlan and Zinman (2011) in the Philippines was also primarily 
female, with 85% of the sample being women. However, as follows from Fiala’s (2018) 
estimation, there was no significant impact of loans on business profit in the pooled 
sample and in women-only sub-sample. The significantly positive impact was present 
exclusively in the men-only sub-sample.
Cai et al. (2020) conducted another RCT study that reported the positive impact 
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of microfinance on household incomes and poverty reduction. The study evaluated a 
large-scale village banking program in China that aimed to increase credit access to 
households in poor villages. A total of 1500 households in 50 villages, comprising 
10 counties, were surveyed at baseline, and then 1351 households (90%) were re-
interviewed at the endline survey conducted two years later. The study found that the 
credit program increased household income by 46%, with the intent-to-treat effect 
being significant at the 1% level. The program also reduced poverty by 17% and 
increased durable consumption by 30%.(11)
Notably, Cai et al. (2020) followed the exact same empirical specification as the 
Special Issue studies and, therefore, a large part of their paper is dedicated to the 
investigation as to why their results differ. They argue that the difference can be 
attributed to several factors: lower access to formal credit before the program, lower 
interest rate, less frequent repayment schedule and, what is perhaps unique to China, 
a higher capital return of credit-constrained households on off-farm employment.(12)
We discussed earlier how, given the overall high penetration of MFI, it can be 
difficult to find areas where potential borrowers had no prior access to microfinance. 
Even if one can find those areas/populations, they are unlikely to be representative. 
In China, microfinance NGOs are heavily regulated and have a lower presence than 
in other studied countries. At baseline, only 13% of households had previously 
borrowed from formal institutions. Therefore, program participants are likely to be 
more representative of typical rural, poor households than those studied in the Special 
(11) The study did not look at gender differences in the impacts so it cannot be compared to 
Fiala (2018). The credit program did not exclude men, although it says it gave priority to 
poor households and female members. According to Table 1 in Cai et al. (2020), 94% of 
heads of households, which was the unit of analysis, consisted of men.
(12) Jiang et al. (2020) is another impact study of the credit village program in China. The 
study examined the impact of the credit program in Yunan County, a poor rural county in 
Guangdong Province. Based on the sample of 214 households, Jiang et al. (2020) found that 
the program loosened the credit restrictions; however, there was no impact on educational 
expenditures, medical expenditures, or long-term assets. The paper did not use the RCT 
methodology and conducted just one survey instead of baseline and endline surveys, as in 
Cai et al. (2020), thus explaining the difference in results.
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Issue. Another difference is that the banking program studied in Cai et al. (2020) had 
much lower interest rates (9.4%) and less frequent repayment schedule (annual) than 
other RCT studies. In contrast, all but one Special Issue studies had either monthly 
or weekly repayment frequency and interest rates varying from 14.5% in Morocco 
to 118% in Ethiopia. Finally, China might be unique in its wide availability of high-
paying migrant-wage jobs located in distant cities that are too costly to reach. Credit-
constrained households, who had no choice but to forgo the migrant opportunities 
prior to the program, were able to undertake them upon enrolling in the credit 
program. Indeed, Cai et al. (2020) demonstrated that the increase in wage income was 
driven by a 24-day increase in work as out-migrants to other provinces and that the 
total wage labor supply increased by 26 days per year as compared to the baseline of 
116 wage labor days.
5. Negative Impact of Microfinance
This review would not be complete without mentioning how microfinance can 
negatively impact the poor and their communities. It might be surprising that 
providing credit to the poor can have negative consequences, but, as it turns out, there 
are many examples—both on a local and on a global scale—of microfinance going 
awry.
On a local scale, there is an abundance of anecdotal stories of extremely abusive 
and coercive microfinance officers who enforce repayments with, as one paper put 
it, “alarming zeal”. For example, Rutherford (2006) mentioned an African MFI that 
locked groups of borrowers into a meeting hall until they settled their outstanding 
loan repayments for that week. Even more disturbingly, in India, the prosecution of 
defaulters can involve insults, physical threats, property confiscation, or even tying up 
a defaulter on a public square under direct sunlight (Arunachalam, 2011; Bédécarrats 
et al., 2020).
On a global scale, microfinance penetration can lead to over-indebtedness and full-
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blown sub-prime-style crises. The first country-level microfinance crisis occurred in 
Bolivia in 1999. Initially, in the early 1990s, Bolivian MFIs were highly successful 
in providing credit to the poor in a sustainable manner. Standard microfinance 
practices, such as frequent group meetings, joined liability, immediate follow ups 
on delinquency, and small initial loan amounts, helped minimize lenders’ risks and 
ensured high repayment rates. Even though these practices sacrificed borrowers’ 
convenience, they were tolerated by borrowers due to a lack of alternatives. In the 
late 1990s, the commercialization of the industry, including entry by large consumer 
lenders, forced the MFIs to relax their practices to become more attractive to clients. 
With easily obtainable loans from multiple lenders, be it commercial lenders or 
standard MFIs, the crisis of sobreendeudamiento (over-indebtedness) arrived. The 
debtors revolted, and “by mid-1999 the consumer lending movement crashed” (Rhyne, 
2002, p. 13).
Unfortunately, the collapse of consumer lending in Bolivia in 1999 is not unique. 
Morocco, Nicaragua, and Pakistan in 2008; Bosnia in 2009; and the Indian state 
Andhra Pradesh in 2010 all had their own MFI crises that featured the same 
scenarios: easily obtainable loans, over-indebtedness, rapidly growing client defaults, 
and then the losses and/or bankruptcy of the MFIs (Bateman and Chang, 2012).
The introductory article for the Special Issue (Banerjee et al., 2015b) acknowledged 
the rising concerns about over-indebtedness and microcredit becoming a debt trap. 
However, it also argued that the six Special Issue RCTs found no evidence that 
expanded access from one MFI led borrowers to take on additional debt from other 
sources (p. 11). In other words, the six studies found no evidence of borrowers 
exhibiting the debt-trap behavior. Recall, however, that the same RCT studies 
examined the margins (areas or populations) that were underserved by MFIs. As the 
very first step was to find a group that, at baseline, had little access to the microcredit, 
the Special Issue studies were ill-equipped to evaluate the negative aspects associated 
with over-indebtedness.
In addition to the well-recognized potential for over-indebtedness, other negative 
impacts of microfinance suggested in the literature include worsened or, at best, 
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unchanged poverty levels, increased income inequality, increased workloads and child 
labor, decreased school enrollment, and the creation of dependencies and barriers 
to sustainable local economic and social development (van Rooyen et al., 2012). 
However, convincingly showing the negative impacts of microfinance runs into the 
exact same methodological problems as any other microfinance impact study, such 
as selection issues, low statistical power, and so on. For example, there is little 
debate that over-indebtedness is a problem, but establishing a causal link between 
microfinance and over-indebtedness would be a much harder task.
Nonetheless, there are studies that are able to rigorously demonstrate that 
microfinance can lead to negative outcomes-not necessarily on average but, at 
least, for certain groups of borrowers. For example, Coleman (1999) showed that 
microfinance had a negative impact on men’s healthcare expenditures and trapped 
some female borrowers in a debt trap. Kondo et al. (2008) showed that microfinance 
helped well-to-do households by increasing their earnings and expenditures, but it had 
a negative effect on the impoverished households. Gantle et al. (2015) studied female 
entrepreneurs in Ghana and showed that some of the borrowers became worse off due 
to their inability to repay the loans. Finally, Seng (2018) provided a rigorous analysis 
of the impact of microfinance on household welfare in Cambodia, a country in the top 
five in terms of MFI penetration rates. The selection bias was addressed using two 
different econometric techniques: the endogenous switching model and the bivariate 
discrete choice model with endogenous treatment effects. Using a sample of 7801 
households, Seng (2018) showed that the effect of microcredit on household welfare 
was negative and that the difference was statistically significant at the 1% level.
6. Conclusion
I conclude the survey by presenting my personal take on the impact evaluation 
literature and its current state. First, in my opinion, the use of RCT methodology, 
which occupies a central part of this paper—is a correct move in the right direction 
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but one that came too late. With an exception of, perhaps, China, where microcredit 
programs are heavily regulated and are not widespread, microfinance penetration is 
too high. It is a difficult, if not impossible, task to find a population that, at baseline, 
has no access to microfinance. While other surveys tend to summarize the literature 
results cautiously as “we still know very little about the impact of microfinance” (Dahal 
and Fiala, 2020, p. 1), I personally think differently: as far as the big questions go 
(e.g., Have regional poverty rates fallen thanks to microcredit? and Do MFIs have a 
transformative impact in the lives of their customers?) we will never find out.
Second, there is an undeniable disconnect between how much the microfinance 
industry is praised for its transformative role in alleviating poverty and the lack 
of rigorous evidence supporting those claims. It creates a fundamental puzzle: If 
microcredit is not creating large, positive impacts, why are poor people continuing to 
borrow, especially when they are paying relatively high interest rates year after year? 
(Morduch, 2020). A positive answer is that borrowers clearly need microloans, and 
researchers are the ones asking the wrong questions and looking at the wrong places. 
I personally tend to think negatively. Setting aside the issue of some borrowers falling 
into a debt trap, there is evidence of constant pressure from microfinance officers 
that borrowers use microfinance services. Rutherford (2006) reports multiple in-depth 
interviews with Grameen Bank clients, and the word “pressure” is very common in 
those interviews: “Now they [a household that was a microfinance borrower] ... are 
resisting pressure from the centre manager to take a loan” (p. 15); “but as is usually the 
case she came under strong pressure from the staff to borrow as well as save.” (p. 38); 
“As pressure piles on to centre managers to recruit as fast as possible” (p. 43), etc. The 
more borrowers MFIs serve, the more success they can claim, the more donations 
they can receive and, we should not forget that, the higher the increase in the salaries 
of executives.(13) In my opinion, it is this pressure to take loans that microlenders 
transfer onto the borrowers, and not a genuine need for microloans, that drives so 
many people to continue to borrow from these MFIs.
(13) In a few instances when MFIs went public via IPO, the gains that senior managers were 
able to garner were at the level of tens of millions of dollars (Bateman and Chang, 2012).
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Third, there is a clear consensus that the impact of microfinance is heterogeneous. 
In particular, there are groups of borrowers who seem to benefit from microfinance. 
However, given the statistical power issues, it is difficult to determine an effect that is 
statistically significant, because looking at sub-groups necessarily reduces the sample 
size. While more work is needed, this seems highly promising, as it allows for a more 
targeted application of microfinance instead of pressuring all potential borrowers into 
taking loans.
Finally, when something becomes as huge as the microfinance industry has become, 
and when this something deals with the most vulnerable population, it is prudent to 
err on the side of skepticism and cautiousness. However, credit must be given where 
credit is due, no pun intended. Microfinance has accomplished something that, for 
a long time, has been considered impossible: providing credit and other financial 
services to the poor. Microfinance has also accomplished this in a very smart way 
by combining innovative methodologies that worked. Thus, in my mind, there is no 
question that the existence of sustainable services providing financial services to the 
poor is a miracle, not a mirage.
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